INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is the scheme of mechanisms, procedure, rules and practices by which corporations are controlled and directed. It also provides the framework for attaining a company's objectives. Berle et al. (1932) and Jensen et al. (1976) come up to the view that corporate governance is assumed to be a fundamental stress between shareholders and corporate managers. Company must follow all the rules, regulations and requirement of the disclosure set by the Securities and Exchange Commission's in order to be listed on major stock exchanges. Ross (1973) describes agency theory in his classical article stated as "The Economic Theory of Agency". Then the theory was properly described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as principal problems. Companies with good corporate governance also tend to reduce the agency problems between shareholders and managers of the firm and provide long term advantage to the investors and shareholders. Disclosure is the significant mechanism of corporate governance. Wallace and Naser, (1995) raise the point that financial disclosure is an abstract concept and can be measured directly. Companies must disclose good and bad information for fair investing process for the investors. Forker (1992) investigates the link between corporate governance and disclosure quality. The studies found the negative relationship between board size and disclosure quality. Khoshbakht and Mohammad Zadeh Salteh (2011) examine the alliance between the corporate governance mechanisms and the flexible disclosure information in Iranian listed firms over the period from (2002 to 2009). The study found significant relation with the optional disclosure of information and observed insignificant relation between ownership concentration and discretionary disclosure of information The Companies with good corporate governance also tend to reduce the agency problems between shareholders and managers of the firm and provide long term advantage to the investors and shareholders. Wallace and Naser, (1995) raise the point that financial disclosure is an abstract concept and can be measured directly. The Companies must disclose good and bad information for fair investing process for the investors. There is need to inspect whether the disclosure practices taken by the listed companies are sufficient quality and do they satisfy the information needs of the investors. The governance structures in Pakistan are still undergoing changes and investors are less protected. Therefore, the study tries to make connection between corporate governance mechanisms and the disclosure quality in case of Pakistan. The current study intends to answer the following questions:
 Does board size impact disclosure quality?  Whether board independence impact disclosure quality?  Does CEO duality impact disclosure quality?  Whether audit committee independence impact disclosure quality?  What is the impact of institutional ownership on disclosure quality?  What is impact of family ownership on disclosure quality?  Whether managerial ownership impact disclosure quality?
LITERATURE REVIEW
The corporate Governance and disclosure quality is considered the hot issue for the regulators, analyst, researchers and investors. Researchers like Lung & Lundholm (2003) figure out a positive bond between the level of information and level of financial disclosure incorporated in annual reports. They also find that, the firms having high quality disclosure was controlled and directed by families and also contain high proportion of independent director and independence of audit committee as well. Marston and Shrives (1991) discuss about the types of information disclose i.e. voluntary disclosure and required disclosure. Bushee and Noe (2001) conjointly supported this argument. Eventually, their results show that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure measurement. One of another literature, Fama and Jensen (1983) studied that any organizations that consist of high number of independent directors in a board have always stronger monitoring and controlling power over managerial decisions. In a board the presence of non-executive directors have confirmed that the effective monitoring power in the board. Arcay and Vazquez (2005) study the link between corporate governance attributes, firm characteristics and extent of voluntary disclosure in Spain. The study has used the independent directors, audit committee, Chairman/CEO duality and board size. Firm size was used as a control variable.
The following discussions provide some explanations that information plays a vital role to play for the disclosure of information to their users. Similarly, Katmun (2012) examines the factors which can influence the disclosure quality of the firm. The study findings established some of the variables in which he concluded that positive and significant relationship between number of board meetings, board independence, audit committee and disclosure quality which also describe the source of information delivered to the end users. More researchers like Khoshbakht and Mohammad et al. (2011) also examine the alliance between the corporate governance mechanisms and the flexible disclosure information in Iranian listed firms over the period 2002 to 2009. The researchers find out a significant relation with the optional disclosure of information and find no significant relation between ownership concentration and discretionary disclosure of information. The results describe that there is negative and weakly associated the double role of CEO with information voluntary disclosure. Effective corporate governance make sure the reliable accounting and high quality financial disclosure, which endow with the transparency of information that allow users especially shareholders and other stakeholder to make effective decisions. Financial reporting of the firms may improve by the existence of independent directors on the board (Peasnell et al., 2000) . Moreover H1: Higher the number of independent directors in the board has higher level of corporate disclosures.
H2:
Higher the number of institutional investors more will be the firm's corporate disclosures.
H3:
The board having large number directors tend to have more disclosure of the firm.
H4:
Audit committee independence has positive impact on disclosure quality of the firm.
H5
: CEO duality impact negatively on disclosure quality of the firm.
H6:
Family controlled firms have negatively associated with disclosure quality.
H7:
There is negatively an effect of higher levels of managerial ownership on the quality of voluntary disclosure 
Variables Specification

Dependent variable: Disclosure Quality (DQ)
Disclosure index developed for the study is used as a measure of disclosure quality. The maximum score that a company can obtained on this index is 100. The score are divided into five sub categories which would combine to make an aggregate score for each company i.e. Corporate Objectives (6 points) Director's Report (24 points), Disclosure Score (18), Stakeholder's Information (20 points), Corporate Governance (32 points); Safia Nosheen, (2012). The existing study works initially on the data of 100 high capitalized firms. This study used the OLS, panel data technique for the analysis of the result. In panel data, we can observe different cross sectional units for several years, which can be pooled together; this will permit us to increase the sample size. Hence, panel data technique is best technique where both time series and cross sectional data at same time can be estimated.
Independent Variables
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section includes correlation matrix, descriptive statistics, and regression analysis.
Correlation Matrix
The main reason of correlation is the indication of the relation between two variables or to study whether the two variables move in similar or opposite directions. This technique also deals regarding the strength and trend of connection among variables. The result from the correlation matrix is given below in the 
Descriptive Statistics
It is used to get the feel of data. It includes, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, skewness, and kurtosis. 
Regression Analysis
The regression analysis shows the link between corporate governance and disclosure quality in eighty (80) high capitalized firms listed in Karachi stock exchange. For the purpose of analysis, panel regression is used. Panel data analysis consists of common effect model, fixed effect model and random effect model. The results of the tests are given below in Table ( 3).
Table3. The table (3) can be discussed as the adjusted R-square of the common effect model is 0.09, which means that only 9.5 unit changes in dependent variable is explained by independent variables. While in the above table, the variable audit committee independence (ACI) has negative and insignificant relationship with disclosure quality. Similarly, the variables board independence (BI) and board size (BS) have positive but insignificant relationship with the disclosure quality. However, CEO Duality, Family ownership (FMO) and managerial ownership (MGO) have negative but significant relationship with the disclosure quality. While, institutional ownership (INSTO) has negative and insignificant relationship with disclosure quality. Moreover, the control variables leverage (LEV) has positive and significant relationship while the variables firm size (FS) and sales growth (SGROW) have both negative and insignificant relationship with disclosure quality. In the above table variables, audit committee independence (ACI) and board independence (BI) have positive and significant relationship with disclosure quality while Board size (BS), has negative but significant relationship. Moreover, family ownership (FMO) has negative and insignificant relationship. While, CEO Duality, managerial ownership (MGO), institutional ownership (INSTO) have positive but insignificant relationship with disclosure quality. In the case of control variables firm size (FM) has positive and significant relation and leverage (LEV) has negative but significant relation and sale growth (SGROW) has negative and significant relation with disclosure quality. After the sort out the result of common and fixed effect model now to check whether common or fixed model would be appropriate, as both models have different assumption to be selected. For this we have to run likelihood ratio test which have null and alternate hypothesis.
Fixed Effect Model
Likelihood Ratio Test (F-test)
This test is used to check which model is appropriate, common or fixed model. From table (5), the probability of cross section is significant, which means that the study accept alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis, which means that the appropriate model is fixed effect model as the probability value is less than 5% significant level. Moving towards the Hausman test, the study must have to estimate the random effect model to choose the appropriate model between fixed and random effect model. In the above table the variables, audit committee independence (ACI) and board independence (BI) and whereas board size, CEO duality, family ownership (FMO) have negative but insignificant relationship with the disclosure quality, which shows that it can affect the firm disclosure quality performance. Moreover, the variables managerial ownership (MGO) and institutional ownership (INSTO) have negative and insignificant relationship. In the case of control variables firm size (FS) has positive significant relationship with disclosure quality. While, leverage (LEV) and sales growth have negative sign but leverage show significant and sales growth shows insignificant relationship on the disclosure quality. The study carries out the Hausmen test to select the suitable model between fixed and random effects.
Table5. Likelihood ratio test (F-test)
Random Effect Model
Hausman Test
Table (7) indicates that the null hypothesis of the hausman test in random effect is consistent and efficient and the alternative hypothesis in random effect is inconsistent, so fixed effect is more suitable. Form table (7) results, it is cleared that the value of the probability is significant and less than the 5% significant level, hence the study accept the alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis, indicating that the best appropriate model is fixed effect model.
Table7. Hausman test
Discussion of Results
The main purpose of this result discussion, as to ensure our results is consistent with the previous studies. The variable board independence has showed positive and significant relationship with the disclosure quality and indicating that when there is 1 unit change in board's independence may bring the change in the result of disclosure quality by 12 units respectively. So from the given discussion we accept our second hypothesis that is H2: higher the level of size of the independent directors in a firm's board may result in higher level of corporate disclosure. The variable board size explains significant and negative impact on disclosure quality of the firms and indicating that with 1 unit change in board size may bring the result of 0.7 unit decrease in disclosure quality. . Hence, from the above findings we accept our H3: hypothesis that is board size and disclosure quality has the negatively related with each other. Furthermore, the variable CEO duality has negative and significant relationship with the disclosure quality. It is indicating that when chief executive has also the role of chairman in the company, and if it is increasing by 1 unit then the company disclosure quality may reduce to 19 units. The hypothesis H4 is that CEO duality finds negative impact on disclosure practices. Moreover, the variable family ownership shows negative and insignificant on the disclosure quality. The coefficient -0.019 means that one percent 1 unit increase in the managerial ownership there is 0.019 decreases in the disclosure quality of the firms. Additionally, the variable institutional ownership shows positive and insignificant impact on the firm disclosure quality. So therefore, we accepted our hypothesis as well i.e. the firm having higher proportion of institutional investors showing the positive relationship with the disclosure quality of the firm.
The study also includes some control variables like firm size which has positive and significant impact on the disclosure quality of the firm. The coefficient 0.014 describe that when 1 unit change in firm size there is increaseof 0.014 in disclosure quality of the firm. Leverage which is showed negative and significant impact on the disclosure quality and coefficient -0.05 means that 1 unit change in leverage reduces the disclosure quality level of the firm, while the variable sales growth showing negative but insignificant relationship with the disclosure quality and coefficient -0.001 means that when there is 1 unit change in sales growth of the firm it will decrease the level of disclosure by 0.001.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Conclusion
This research study endows with the relation between corporate governance and disclosure quality of the eighty (80) high capitalize non-financial firms which are listed on KSE-100 index of Pakistan (currently known as Pakistan stock exchange). For this purpose, the studies use disclosure score to find out the disclosure quality of the individual firm. The research uses disclosure quality as a dependent variable and corporate governance attributes as independent variables i.e. audit committee
The study suggests that every listed company must have more independent directors on their board, so that decision making are made independently in the best concern of all shareholders, and also agency problems between management and shareholders could be reduce to appropriate level. Audit committee independence has more influence on disclosing information to the public, it must be contains independent directors in the committee. Similarly, institutional ownership or shareholders like financial institutions is the active shareholders that monitor the activities of a firm. It also plays a role of watch dogs over management activities.
Direction for Future Research
The current study only considered those companies which are listed on Pakistan stock exchange. The study can be extended to the Asian growing economies and compare the results with respect to different countries level. Furthermore, the study also contain just non-financial companies data, so in future a comparable study can be conducted where at one end a sample of financial companies can be taken and at the other end non-financial companies can be used. 
List of Abbreviation
DISCL=
Availability of data and material
All the data of this research was collected from annual reports of companies, Pakistan stock exchange and State bank of Pakistan data sources.
ANNEXURE I
Disclosure Score Measurement Comprehensive related party disclosure 1 3. 4 Disclosure of all changes in corresponding figures 1 3. 5 Adequate disclosure of significant judgment and estimates 1 3. 6 Detailed disclosure of Financial instruments 1 3. 7 Further disclosure of facilities provided to CEO and Directors 1 3. 8 Detailed disclosure of all contingencies and commitments 1 3. 9 Adequate disclosure of new accounting standard and their expected impact 1 3.10 Detailed capacity disclosure 1 3. 
5.3
The board structure and its committees 1 5. 4 Chairman of the board other than CEO 1 5. 5 Information on the Board committees and their terms of references and number of meetings held A Information on the Board committees B
Terms of references C Number of meetings held 5. 6 Role and function of the board of directors 2 5. 7 Salient features of the audit committee charter/terms of reference 1 5. 8 Name of independent Directors /Non executive's directors to be disclosed 1 5. 9 Disclose for all members of board of directors 2 A Profile of each director B Involvement /engagement of each director in their companies/entities as CEO, director, CFO, or trustee etc. 
